The adversarial culture in philosophy does not serve the truth | Aeon Ideas

is department chair and professor of history of philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. He is currently finalising his latest book Socialising Minds: Intersubjectivity in Early Modern Philosophy (2020). Edited bySam Dresser Nero and Seneca (1904), by Eduardo Barrón Gonzáles. Photo courtesy Museo Nacional del Prado, Madrid Philosophical discussions, whether in a professional setting or at the bar, frequently consist of calling out mistakes in whatever has been proposed: ‘This is all very well, but …’ This adversarial style is often celebrated as truth-conducive. Eliminating false assumptions seems to leave us with truth in the marketplace of ideas. Although this is a fairly pervasive practice (even I am practising it right now), I doubt that it is a particularly good approach to philosophical discussions. The lack of progress in adversarial philosophical exchange might rest on a simple but problematic division of labour: in professional settings such as talks, semi

is department chair and professor of history of philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. He is currently finalising his latest book Socialising Minds: Intersubjectivity in Early Modern Philosophy (2020). Edited bySam Dresser Nero and Seneca (1904), by Eduardo Barrón Gonzáles. Photo courtesy Museo Nacional del Prado, Madrid Philosophical discussions, whether in a professional setting or at the bar, frequently consist of calling out mistakes in whatever has been proposed: ‘This is all very well, but …’ This adversarial style is often celebrated as truth-conducive. Eliminatin