The lethal trifecta for AI agents: private data, untrusted content, and external communication
If you are a user of LLM systems that use tools (you can call them “AI agents” if you like) it is critically important that you understand the risk of …
The lethal trifecta for AI agents: private data, untrusted content, and external communication Simon Willison’s Weblog Subscribe Sponsored by: Microsoft - Agent projects stall between demo and production. Microsoft's MVP checklist closes that gap. Try it The lethal trifecta for AI agents: private data, untrusted content, and external communication 16th June 2025 If you are a user of LLM systems that use tools (you can call them “AI agents” if you like) it is critically important that you understand the risk of combining tools with the following three characteristics. Failing to understand this
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