Epistemic Consequentialism | The Philosophical Review | Duke University Press

Kevin Dorst; Epistemic Consequentialism. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2020; 129 (3): 484–489. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8311473 Download citation file: Epistemic consequentialism is the view that (at least some) features of epistemic rationality can be explained in terms of features of epistemic value. The standard framework is decision-theoretic: consider an agent who has a menu of doxastic options (credal-states, belief-states, or plans to update them) and a purely epistemic utility function (standardly, a measure of accuracy). What option should they choose to optimally promote epistemic utility? Epistemic consequentialism is a hot topic, for it offers a rare combination of (1) a fruitful, tractable framework that (appears to) provide insight into both old and new questions; and (2) apparently devastating problems that (threaten to) undermine any such insight. This combination has sustained a breakneck literature, with sympathizers claiming ever more insights, objecto

Kevin Dorst; Epistemic Consequentialism. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2020; 129 (3): 484–489. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8311473 Download citation file: Epistemic consequentialism is the view that (at least some) features of epistemic rationality can be explained in terms of features of epistemic value. The standard framework is decision-theoretic: consider an agent who has a menu of doxastic options (credal-states, belief-states, or plans to update them) and a purely epistemic utility function (standardly, a measure of accuracy). What option should they choose to optimally promo