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A Case Against Strong Longtermism
vmasrani.github.io · 6,543 words · saved by 1 readers
A response to Hilary Greaves and William MacAskill (part 1/4)
A Case Against Strong Longtermism | Vaden Masrani A Case Against Strong Longtermism A response to Hilary Greaves and William MacAskill (part 1/4) Unless and until some objection proves damning, we should be predisposed towards believing axiological strong longtermism. - Hilary Greaves and William MacAskill, The Case for Strong Longtermism The first of a four part series on longtermism and bayesian epistemology. Contents Preliminaries The foundational assumptions of longtermism What’s all the fuss with expected values anyway? In expectation, the future is undefined We should prefer good things
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