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Frankfurt cases - Wikipedia

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Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise. The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) forms part of an influential argument for the incompatibility of responsibility and causal determinism, often called the core argument for incompatibilism.[1][2][3] This argument is detailed below: Traditionally, compatibilists (defenders of the compatibility of free will and causal determinism, like A. J. Ayer, Walter Terence Stace, and Daniel Dennett) reject premise two. On a compatibilist analysis, an agent could have done otherwise just in case the counterfactual conditional 'if the agent had wanted to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise' is true.[5] Importantly, this counterfactual conditional can be true withou

Frankfurt cases - Wikipedia Jump to content From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Philosophical argument This article needs more citations . Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources . Unsourced material may be challenged and removed . Find sources: "Frankfurt cases" – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR ( July 2026 ) ( Learn how and when to remove this message ) Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases ) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibil

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