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The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief

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[[Published in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford, 2003).]] Experiences and beliefs are different sorts of mental states, and are often taken to belong to very different domains. Experiences are paradigmatically phenomenal, characterized by what it is like to have them. Beliefs are paradigmatically intentional, characterized by their propositional content. But there are a number of crucial points where these domains intersect. One central locus of intersection arises from the existence of phenomenal beliefs: beliefs that are about experiences. The most important phenomenal beliefs are first-person phenomenal beliefs: a subject's beliefs about his or her own experiences, and especially, about the phenomenal character of the experiences that he or she is currently having. Examples include the belief that one is now having a red experience, or that one is experiencing pain. These phenomenal beliefs raise important issues in metaphysics, in t

The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief David J. Chalmers Department of Philosophy University of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721. [email protected] [[Published in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford, 2003).]] 1 Introduction Experiences and beliefs are different sorts of mental states, and are often taken to belong to very different domains. Experiences are paradigmatically phenomenal, characterized by what it is like to have them. Beliefs are paradigmatically intentional, characterized by t

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