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Artificial consciousness: a perspective from the free energy principle | Philosophical Studies

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Does the assumption of a weak form of computational functionalism, according to which the right form of neural computation is sufficient for consciousness, entail that a digital computational simulation of such neural computations is conscious? Or must this computational simulation be implemented in the right way, in order to replicate consciousness? From the perspective of Karl Friston’s free energy principle, self-organising systems (such as living organisms) share a set of properties that could be realised in artificial systems, but are not instantiated by computers with a classical (von Neumann) architecture. I argue that at least one of these properties, viz. a certain kind of causal flow, can be used to draw a distinction between systems that merely simulate, and those that actually replicate consciousness. Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript. We live in times in which some smart people believe that at least a few existing artificial intelligences (AIs) are conscious. How ca

Artificial consciousness: a perspective from the free energy principle Open access Published: 26 June 2024 Volume 181 , pages 1947–1970 ( 2024 ) Cite this article You have full access to this open access article Download PDF Save article View saved research Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript Artificial consciousness: a perspective from the free energy principle Download PDF Abstract Does the assumption of a weak form of computational functionalism, according to which the right form of neural computation is sufficient for consciousness, entail that a digital computational si

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