A third path to explain consciousness: Biological computationalism

This article has been reviewed according to Science X's editorial process and policies. Editors have highlighted the following attributes while ensuring the content's credibility: fact-checked trusted source proofread Right now, the debate about consciousness often feels frozen between two entrenched positions. On one side sits computational functionalism, which treats cognition as something you can fully explain in terms of abstract information processing: get the right functional organization (regardless of the material it runs on) and you get consciousness. On the other hand is biological naturalism, which insists that consciousness is inseparable from the distinctive properties of living brains and bodies: biology isn't just a vehicle for cognition, it is part of what cognition is. Each camp captures something important, but the stalemate suggests that something is missing

This article has been reviewed according to Science X's editorial process and policies. Editors have highlighted the following attributes while ensuring the content's credibility: fact-checked trusted source proofread Right now, the debate about consciousness often feels frozen between two entrenched positions. On one side sits computational functionalism, which treats cognition as something you can fully explain in terms of abstract information processing: get the right functional or

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• Mackenzie Dion